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Abstract. We present a network influence game that models players
strategically seeding the opinions of nodes embedded in a social net-
work. A social learning dynamic, whereby nodes repeatedly update their
opinions to resemble those of their neighbors, spreads the seeded opinions
through the network. After a fixed period of time, the dynamic halts and
each player’s utility is determined by the relative strength of the opinions
held by each node in the network vis-a`-vis the other players. We show
that the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium cannot be guaranteed in
general. However, if the dynamics are allowed to progress for a sufficient
amount of time so that a consensus among all of the nodes is obtained,
then the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium can be guaranteed. The
computational complexity of finding a pure strategy best response is
shown to be NP-complete, but can be efficiently approximated to within
a (1− 1/e) factor of optimal by a simple greedy algorithm.
Key words: social networks, opinion dynamics, game theory, Nash
equilibrium, computational complexity, approximation algorithm
1 Introduction
Opinions are shaped by the information individuals obtain through their social
connections. These opinions inform our career decisions, political views, and
purchasing behaviors, which can ultimately spread to affect an entire society.
The influence maximization problem [14] asks: Given the ability to seed a small
number of individuals (nodes) in a social network to adopt a desired behavior
(e.g., to purchase a product, support a political candidate, contract an infection,
etc.), which nodes should be selected so that the behavior subsequently spreads
to a maximum fraction of the entire population?
Strategic extensions to the influence maximization problem that involve two
or more players representing competing, substitutable behaviors (products, opin-
ions, infections, etc.) where each player selects a set of seed nodes so as to max-
imize the fraction of the population that eventually adopts their represented
⋆ This research was conducted while S. D. Johnson was a graduate student at the
University of California, Davis.
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behavior, have subsequently been studied; see, for example, [4, 1, 5, 17, 8, 11].
A common feature among most of these models is that the diffusion dynamics
they use involve nodes making binary decisions to determine whether to fully
adopt one of the diffused opinions. Furthermore, these models often employ pro-
gressive SI-style dynamics in which nodes that do not have an opinion must first
make an irreversible decision to fully commit themselves to a single opinion in
order to become a participant in the subsequent propagation of their adopted
opinion. Although such dynamics meet the desiderata of many applications with
practical importance, we believe them to be unnatural for the diffusion of opin-
ions through social networks because of the requirement that opinions are only
allowed to pass through nodes that have already committed irreversibly to a
particular preference.
In the current work, we present the network influence game (NIG) to model
the strategic seeding of opinions in a social network by m ≥ 2 players and
employs a dynamic that is arguably more appropriate than the SI-style dynamics
used elsewhere. In our model, each node maintains a vector of opinions toward
the m players, and in each discrete time step, a node’s opinion is updated to
reflect a weighted averaging of their previous opinion and the opinions of their
neighbors. These dynamics proceed in accordance with the consensus dynamic
[6], and terminate after a period of T time steps. The consensus dynamic has
played a prominent role in the study of opinion dynamics in social networks
– see, for example, the surveys by Jackson [12, 13]. In our competitive model,
players’ utilities are defined to be a function of each node’s relative opinions
toward the players upon the conclusion of the dynamic process.
The NIG model is formally presented in Section 2, followed by a discussion
on the nature of influence pertaining to it in Section 2.1. Section 3 contains our
results on the existence of pure Nash equilibrium strategies. We show that exis-
tence can be guaranteed if the dynamics run until a consensus opinion is reached,
but cannot be guaranteed otherwise. In Section 4 we show that computing a pure
strategy best response is NP-complete, yet can be efficiently approximated to
within a factor of (1 − 1/e) of optimal. Section 5 concludes the paper with a
discussion and suggested topics for future research.
2 Model
The network influence game NIG is specified by a tuple 〈M,G,∆C , T,b, pi〉 with
a player set, M = {1, . . . ,m}; a network, G = (V,E), represented by a weighted
digraph with |V | = n nodes; the opinion dynamic, ∆C , that determines how
influence spreads between adjacent nodes in the network; the length of time, T ∈
N, that the diffusion dynamic is allowed to proceed; a profile, b = (b1, . . . , bm),
of integer seed budgets bi > 0 for each player i ∈ M ; and a utility function,
pii(·), that aggregates the nodes’ opinions upon the conclusion of the diffusion
dynamics at time T into a non-negative payoff for each player i ∈M .
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We assume that the graphG is strongly connected. Furthermore, we stipulate
that for all edges (u, v) ∈ E, the edge weight w(u, v) > 0 and, for all nodes v ∈ V ,
the sum of all incoming edge weights equals one.
A (pure) strategy for player i is a subset si ⊆ V of at most bi seed nodes. A
strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sm) specifies the seed nodes chosen by all m players,
and is used to set the initial conditions for the opinion dynamics, the result of
which determines the players’ utilities.
The NIG’s opinion dynamics, ∆C , is based on DeGroot’s consensus dynamic
[6]. For this dynamic, each node v ∈ V maintains a length-m opinion vector
xv = (xv1 , . . . , x
v
m) with the entry 0 ≤ x
v
i ≤ 1 representing v’s opinion toward
player i. If xvi > x
v
j , then this is to be interpreted as v holding a more favorable
opinion toward player i than toward player j. We require that the sum of a
node’s opinions is at most one; |xv|1 =
∑
i∈M x
v
i ≤ 1. Since we need to refer to
the evolution of a node’s opinion over time, we will use xv(t) to denote v’s vector
of opinions at time t, with entry xvi (t) representing v’s opinion toward player i
at time t.
The diffusion process is initialized by s at time t = 0. This involves each
player i implanting a “seed opinion” yi into each of the nodes included in si.
The seed opinions yi = (yi1, . . . , y
i
m) are defined as y
i
i = 1 and y
i
j = 0 for all
j 6= i, meaning that yi specifies a high (maximum) opinion toward player i and a
low (minimum) opinion toward all other players j. LetMv(s) = {i | v ∈ si} ⊆M
denote the subset players that include a given node v in their strategy, and define
mv(s) = |Mv(s)|. Finally, let Vs denote the subset of nodes that are designated
as seed nodes by at least one player. We initialize the opinions of the nodes v ∈ V
towards each player i ∈M
xvi (0) =
{
1
mv(s)
∑
j∈Mv
yji if v ∈ Vs
ε if v ∈ V \ Vs,
(1)
where 0 < ε ≪ 1/m is a small constant. Equation (1) specifies that each seed
node v ∈ Vs is initialized to the average seed opinion of the players that include v
in their strategies. Otherwise, for a node v /∈ Vs, initialization involves assigning
a ε opinion value toward every player i ∈M .
The consensus dynamic, ∆C , proceeds in discrete time steps t = 1, 2, . . . , T
and specifies that the opinion of a node v at time t is a weighted average of its
prior opinion and the opinions of its neighbors at time t− 1. Specifically,
xvi (t) = (1− α) · x
v
i (t− 1) + α
∑
u∈N+(v)
w(u, v) · xui (t− 1), ∀i ∈M, (2)
where N+(v) = {u | (u, v) ∈ E} is the set of v’s incoming neighbors in G and
0 < α < 1 is a model parameter.
This dynamic can be expressed more succinctly in matrix form. Let A be
the weighted adjacency matrix of G with entries aij = w(i, j), and define Γ =
(1−α)I +αA⊺ to be the n×n influence matrix2 with entries γvu conveying the
2 Γ is sometimes referred to as a listening structure [7] or interaction matrix [10].
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amount of direct influence that the opinions of node u shape those of node v from
one time step to the next. By construction, Γ is an aperiodic stochastic matrix.
Let xi(t) denote the length-n vector containing entries for each node’s opinion
toward player i at time t. Using Γ and xi(·), we can rewrite the dynamics in
Equation (2) as xi(t) = Γxi(t − 1). In particular, the opinions toward player i
after T time steps is simply xi(T ) = Γ
Txi(0).
3
Upon the termination of the opinion dynamics after T steps, each node v is
left holding an opinion vector xv(T ). The utility for player i ∈ M is defined to
be the average relative opinion held by the population toward i,
pii(s) =
1
n
∑
v∈V
xvi (T )
|xv(T )|1
. (3)
Notice that, (3) implies that for any strategy profile s, we have
∑
i∈M pii(s) = 1,
so the NIG is a constant-sum game.
2.1 Influence
A player’s best response strategy in the NIG involves selecting an “influential”
subset of seed nodes so that, upon the termination of the dynamics, the average
relative opinion held by the nodes toward the player is maximized. The precise
character of influence in this context deserves some examination.
It is well-known that the DeGroot consensus dynamic converges so that a
common opinion is shared by every node in the network is guaranteed as T →∞
when the matrix Γ is aperiodic and stochastic. The consensus obtained is de-
scribed by a weighted sum of the nodes’ initial opinions (at time t = 0), with the
weights given by the entries in the eigenvector of Γ corresponding to the eigen-
value 1. Hence, for sufficiently large T , a node’s influence is directly related to
their eigenvector centrality. However, if T is not large enough to obtain consen-
sus, then a node’s eigenvector centrality no longer corresponds to the influence
they exert on the average opinions upon the termination of the dynamics.
The importance of T in characterizing the influence that a node exerts on a
diffusion process was recently identified in an empirical study by Banerjee et al.
[2] (see also [3]), which led them to define a quantity called diffusion centrality.
Although their definition corresponds to a different diffusion dynamic than the
one we consider in this paper, we can still offer a definition that is qualitatively
similar to theirs but tailored to the consensus dynamic.
Let δ[j] denote the n-dimensional column vector consisting of a one in row
j and zeros everywhere else. The diffusion centrality of a node v is defined to
be the vector cv = Γ T δ[v] whose entries cvu describe the fraction of node u’s
opinion at time T that is due to node v’s initial opinion at time t = 0. As
T → ∞, the convergence of the consensus dynamic ensures that |cvu − c
v
u′ | → 0
for all u, u′ ∈ V ; let cv denote this uniform amount of influence that v’s brings
3 We use Γ T to denote the matrix Γ raised to the T th power. For matrix transposition,
we use the notation Γ ⊺.
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to bear upon the final opinion of every node in V . The value cv is precisely the
v’th entry of the unique left eigenvector c of Γ corresponding to the eigenvalue
1, and the sum of the entries in c equal 1.
3 On the Existence of Pure Nash Equilibrium
This section presents our results on the existence of pure Nash equilibrium strate-
gies. Recall that a pure strategy profile s = (si, s−i) is a Nash equilibrium if, for
every player i ∈M and every possible pure strategy s′i for that player, we have
pii(si, s−i) ≥ pii(s′i, s−i). Throughout this paper, all of the results regarding Nash
equilibrium will be with respect to pure strategies, and all unqualified mentions
of strategy should be understood to refer to a pure strategy; all mentions of Nash
equilibrium refer to pure Nash equilibrium.
3.1 At Consensus
In this section we establish the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria for
NIGs in which T is sufficiently large to ensure that the opinions reach a con-
sensus. In the consensus regime, all nodes share the same final opinion vector,
x(T ) = (x1(T ), . . . , xm(T )), and the utility for each player i ∈M is simply
pii(s) =
xi(T )
|x(T )|1
. (4)
With the profile of weights c = (cv1 , cv2 , . . . , cvn), where cv denotes the weight
of node v’s contribution to this consensus, we can express the consensus opinion
toward player i as xi(T ) =
∑
v∈V c
vxvi (0). Notice that the consensus opinion
xi(T ) for player i is a countably additive function of player i’s strategy, si. This
implies that in order for a deviation from si to s
′
i to increase the consensus
opinion toward player i, then any deviation from si to s
′′
i where s
′′
i = (si \{v})∪
{u}, v ∈ si \ s′i, and u ∈ s
′
i \ si will also increase the consensus opinion toward
player i. In other words, if i can increase their share of the consensus opinion by
swapping k nodes in their strategy, then they can also gain from swapping only
a single node.
A key feature to the consensus case is that, since all nodes will converge
to the same opinion, there is no longer any need for players to make strategic
trade-offs involving increasing their opinion share among one particular subset
of nodes at the cost of decreasing their opinion share elswhere. This is reflected
by the fact that the utility function in Equation (3) reduces to Equation (4) in
the consensus regime (i.e., when T is sufficiently large).
Proposition 1. Every NIG in which T is sufficiently large so as to ensure that
a consensus opinion xv(T ) is reached among every node v ∈ V has at least one
pure Nash equilibrium.
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Proof (Sketch). Assume that the m players are ordered so that b1 ≥ b2 ≥ · · · ≥
bm and the nodes V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} are ordered so that cv1 ≥ cv2 ≥ · · · ≥ cvn .
Set player 1’s seed strategy s1 such that it maximizes x1(T ). The strategies for
players i = 2, 3, . . . ,m will be built sequentially, so that si is a best response to
the profile si−1 = (s1, . . . , si−1). We then argue that, given s
i = (s1, . . . , si−1, si),
for every player j < i, sj is a best response to s
i
−j = (s1, . . . , sj−1, sj+1, . . . , si).
Here, we will give the proof for m = 2 players; the proof for m ≥ 2 players
follows from an inductive argument that is based on similar reasoning.
Set s1 = {v1, . . . , vb1}, and let s2 be a best response to s1 that maximizes
the value of the consensus opinion toward player 2, x2(T ). We have two cases to
consider: i) s1 ∩ s2 = ∅, and ii) s1 ∩ s2 6= ∅.
The first case is trivial: if s2 does not contain any of the nodes in s1, then
player 1 enjoys exclusive access to b1 of the most influential seed nodes.
For the second case, let r = s1 ∩ s2 be the set of seed nodes chosen by
player 2 that are also in s1. Suppose, toward a contradiction, that player 1
can strictly benefit from changing to a strategy s′1 = (s1 \ {u}) ∪ {v} for some
nodes u ∈ r and v ∈ V \ (s1 ∪ s2); i.e., player 1 swaps out a shared node
u for exclusive access to another node v. By swapping out u for v, player 1
may increase the consensus opinion toward them self, but they would also be
increasing the consensus opinion toward player 2 by relinquishing their share of
the influence weight cu. But, by virtue of player 2’s inclusion of u instead of v
in their own best response, it must be the case that the relative opinion toward
player 1 – and, thus, player 1’s utility – would not improve by swapping u for
v. Therefore, pi1(s
′
1, s2) ≤ pi1(s1, s2), contradicting the claim that s
′
1 can earn
player 1 a strictly higher utility than s1. ⊓⊔
3.2 The General Case
In this section, we show that the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium is not
guaranteed in NIGs when the dynamic does not reach a consensus opinion. We
prove the non-existence for the symmetric setting, in which every player shares
the same seed budget; a proof for the asymmetric setting can be found in the
full version of this paper.
Proposition 2. For any m ≥ 2 and symmetric seed budget b, there exist NIGs
that do not admit a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof. A construction that does not admit a pure Nash equilibrium is as follows:
Create µ = m(b+1)+1 nodes v0, v1, . . . , vµ−1, and add directed edges from each
vi to vi+k for k = 1, . . . , b. Next, for each vi, add two additional “petal nodes”
vi,l and vi,r , and add the following four links: (vi, vi,l), (vi, vi,r), (vi,l, vi,r), and
(vi,r , vi). Define the weight of each edge (u, v) to be w(u, v) =
1
|N+(v)| . Note that
the sum of each node’s incoming edge weights equals one, and that the resulting
graph is strongly connected. (See Figure 1 for an example.)
Let G be a graph that implements the above construction, and set the param-
eters α = 1/2 and T = b. Because a player’s optimal strategy will never involve
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Fig. 1. Example of the graph construction in the proof of Proposition 2 with m = 3
players and budgets b = 2. The dark nodes are the “central nodes” and the white ones
are the “petal nodes”. This network does not admit a pure Nash equilibrium.
seeding a petal node, we restrict our attention to strategies comprising only cen-
tral nodes. Let VC denote these µ central nodes. Since |VC | = µ = m(b+ 1) + 1
and the total seed budget among all m players is bm, it will always be the case
that a player’s best response will not include nodes that are already included
in another player’s strategy, and exactly m+ 1 of the central nodes will not be
included as seed nodes in any players’ strategies. Let U ⊂ VC denote these m+1
unseeded central nodes. By design, the graph is constructed so that players pre-
fer selecting seed nodes with successors in U . Of the |U | = m+1 nodes, at most
m of them will have no predecessors that are also in U ; and there will always be
at least one node u∗ ∈ U that does have a predecessor in U . Let u′ denote u∗’s
predecessor in U . A player i with a seed node v ∈ si that is a successor of u′
can always improve their utility by changing to a strategy s′i = {u
′}∪ (si \ {v}).
Since the existence of (at least one) such u∗ is guaranteed, then there will always
be a player i that can change strategies for an increase in utility. Hence, a Nash
equilibrium cannot be obtained. ⊓⊔
4 Computational Properties of Best Response
This section considers the computational problem of finding, for a given player i
and strategy profile s−i, a strategy si that maximizes i’s utility, pii(si, s−i). Such
a strategy si is called a best response to the profile s−i of strategies belonging
to every other player j 6= i.
Our first result in this section establishes the computational complexity of
the best response problem.
Proposition 3. Finding a best response strategy for the NIG is NP-complete.
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Proof (Sketch). Hardness follows by reduction from Set Cover and complete-
ness is due to the fact that the utility function can be computed in polynomial
time. ⊓⊔
Next, we turn the problem of finding an approximate best response. It will be
useful to adopt the following definition of the utility function, which is equivalent
to Equation (3):
pii(s) =
1
n
∑
v∈V
giv(s) (5)
where
giv(s) =
f iv(s)
fv(s)
, (6)
f iv(s) =
∑
u∈si
cuv
mu(s)
+
∑
u∈V \s
εcuv , (7)
and
fv(s) =
∑
j∈M
f jv (s).
Here, we employ the notationmu(s) to denote the cardinality of the setMu(s) =
{j | u ∈ sj} ⊆ M . The quantities cuv , which measure the amount of influence
that node u exerts on node v after T time steps, was defined in Section 2.1.
Our main result for this section establishes that the utility function pii(·) is
submodular,4 from which it follows from the classic result by Nemhauser, Wolsey,
and Fisher [16] that a (1− 1/e) ≈ 0.6321 approximation can be computed using
a greedy algorithm.
Proposition 4. The utility function pii(·) is monotonic and submodular.
Proof (Sketch). The submodularity and monotonicity follow immediately from
establishing that (7) is increasing and (6) is submodular and the fact that since
pii(·) is a function that is defined by a linear combination of submodular functions
(cf., Equation (5)), then pii(·) is itself submodular. ⊓⊔
5 Discussion and Future Work
This paper presented a model for the strategic seeding of opinion dynamics using
the simple, well-studied DeGroot consensus dynamic. We established that the
existence of pure Nash equilibria cannot be guaranteed if the dynamic is not
allowed to run to consensus. The amount of time required for the dynamic to
reach to consensus is known to be slower in networks with modular (homophilic)
connectivity patterns [9]. This implies that in practice, strategic opinion seeding
on real-world social networks, which often exhibit modular structures, should
4 A set function f : Ω → R is submodular if, for every X ⊆ Y ⊂ Ω and element
x ∈ Ω \ Y , we have f(X ∪ {x}) − f(X) ≥ f(Y ∪ {x}) − f(Y ).
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not assume that there will be enough time for the population to coalesce around
a shared, consensus opinion; and, crucially, the individuals that appear to be
attractive seeds in the steady state regime when a consensus is reached (those
with high eigenvector centrality) may not be the best choice if the dynamics halt
in the transient regime.
Our findings in Section 4 on the computational problem of finding best re-
sponse strategies are in alignment with similar competitive influence models that
employ opinion dynamics that are more complex and less amenable to analytical
tractability than the simplistic DeGroot consensus dynamic we use. For exam-
ple, in a competitive extension of the probabilistic independent cascade model of
Kempe et al. [14], Bharathi et al. [4] establish a (1− 1/e) approximation guar-
antee using monotone and submodularity arguments that extend those used
in [14] for the “single-player” setting (see also Mossel and Roch [15]). However,
some models have approximation guarantees that can be significantly worse than
(1−1/e). For example, Borodin et al. [5] show that competitive extensions of the
threshold diffusion model do not share the (1 − 1/e) approximation guarantee
established in [14] for the “single player” optimization setting. They do, however,
offer a variant of the threshold model that does admit a (1 − 1/e) approxima-
tion guarantee. Similar (1−1/e) approximation guarantees are established more
recently in competitive influence maximization models by Goyal et al. [11] and
Fotakis et al. [8].
Our analysis in Section 3 highlights the importance of the length of the
diffusion process, T , in guaranteeing the existence pure strategy Nash equilibria.
The identification of conditions that are sufficient to guarantee the existence of
equilibria for small, non-consensus reaching values of T is an interesting open
problem. Related to this is an intriguing extension to the model that would
allow players to not only choose which nodes to seed, but also when to seed
them. In our preliminary investigations into this extension, we have observed
in simulations that some graphs contain nodes whose influence “peaks” at a
greater magnitude in the dynamic’s transient regime than in the steady state.
We believe that such an extension would also more closely model many real-
world applications, such as political contests and advertising campaigns, where
timing can be an important consideration.
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